Competencia política y presupuesto de vivienda en años electorales en Chile entre 1990 y 2015
Autores/as
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Juan Pablo Urrutia Muñoz
Universidad de Chile
http://orcid.org/0000-0003-2019-006X
Resumen
Los presupuestos nacionales para vivienda responden a muchas variables además del propio déficit habitacional. La competencia electoral es una de ellas, por lo cual su estudio toma relevancia para comprender uno de los orígenes de la inversión en vivienda. Para ello, se escoge el caso de Chile, que mediante un estudio cuantitativo-descriptivo con análisis correlacional utiliza información secundaria sobre su presupuesto público desde 1990 al año 2015 y los resultados de elecciones presidenciales de aquel periodo. Los resultados sugieren que los gobiernos manejaron la glosa de vivienda del presupuesto nacional en periodos electorales, acción acentuada cuando la oposición fue más fuerte. Además, es posible observar que el oficialismo envió “señales costosas” con grandes inversiones en subsidios habitacionales para dar constancia de sus capacidades, pero al mismo tiempo, tal como en un “juego repetitivo”, los votantes observaron que aquellos esfuerzos ocurrían solo en años electorales, por lo que las señales podrían haber sido interpretadas como populismo electoral en vez de una demostración de eficacia.Referencias
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Canes-Wrone, B., Herron, M.C., y Shotts, K.W. (2001). Leadership and pandering: A theory of executive policymaking. American Journal of Political Science, 45(3), 532-550. https://doi.org/10.2307/2669237
Castro, V. y Martins, R. (2016). Are there political cycles hidden inside government expenditures? Applied Economics Letters, 23(1), 34-37. https://doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2015.1047084
Chile Ministerio de Hacienda. (s.f.) Estado de operaciones del gobierno central 1990 – 2017. Recuperado de http://www.dipres.gob.cl/594/w3-propertyvalue-15494.html
Chile Ministerio de Planificación y Cooperación. (1998). Impacto de la política habitacional chilena. Santiago: Autor.
Chile Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo. (2004). Un siglo de políticas en vivienda y barrio. Santiago: Autor.
Drazen, A. y Eslava, M. (2010). Electoral manipulation via voter-friendly spending: Theory and evidence. Journal of Development Economics, 92(1), 39-52. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2009.01.001
Efthyvoulou, G. (2012). Political budget cycles in the European Union and the impact of political pressures. Public Choice, 153(3-4), 295-327. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-011-9795-x
Eibl, F. y Lynge-Mangueira, H. (2017). Electoral confidence and political budget cycles in non-OECD countries. Studies in Comparative International Development, 52(1), 1-19. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12116-016-9230-x
Katsimi, M. y Sarantides, V. (2012). Do elections affect the composition of fiscal policy in developed, established democracies? Public Choice, 151(1), p. 325-362. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-010-9749-8
Khemani, S. (2004). Political cycles in a developing economy: effect of elections in the Indian states. Journal of Development Economics, 73(1), 125-154. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2003.01.002
Maskin, E. y Tirole, J. (2004). The politician and the judge: Accountability in government. American Economic Review, 94(4), 1034-1054. https://doi.org/10.1257/0002828042002606
Nordhaus, W.D. (1975). The political business cycle. The Review of Economic Studies, 42(2), 169-190. https://doi.org/10.2307/2296528
Persson, T. y Tabellini, G. (1990). Macroeconomic policy, credibility and politics. Abingdon: Taylor & Francis.
Persson, T. y Tabellini, G. (2003). Do electoral cycles differ across political systems? Milan: IGIER.
Rogoff, K. (1987). Equilibrium political budget cycles. Cambridge, MA.: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Rogoff, K. y Sibert, A. (1988). Elections and macroeconomic policy cycles. The Review of Economic Studies, 55(1), 1-16. https://doi.org/10.2307/2297526
Shi, M. y Svensson, J. (2002). Conditional political budget cycles. London: Centre for Economic Policy Research.
Shi, M. y Svensson, J. (2006). Political budget cycles: Do they differ across countries and why? Journal of Public Economics, 90(8-9), 1367-1389. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2005.09.009
Spence, M. (1973). Job market signaling. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 87(3), p. 355-374. https://doi.org/10.2307/1882010
Vergne, C. (2009). Democracy, elections and allocation of public expenditures in developing countries. European Journal of Political Economy, 25(1), 63-77. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2008.09.003
Alt, J.E. y Lassen, D.D. (2006). Transparency, political polarization, and political budget cycles in OECD countries. American Journal of Political Science, 50(3), 530-550. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00200.x
Banco Mundial. (s.f.). Chile. Recuperado de http://data.worldbank.org/country/chile
Brender, A. y Drazen. (2005). Political budget cycles in new versus established democracies. Journal of Monetary Economics, 52(7), 1271-1295. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmoneco.2005.04.004
Canes-Wrone, B., Herron, M.C., y Shotts, K.W. (2001). Leadership and pandering: A theory of executive policymaking. American Journal of Political Science, 45(3), 532-550. https://doi.org/10.2307/2669237
Castro, V. y Martins, R. (2016). Are there political cycles hidden inside government expenditures? Applied Economics Letters, 23(1), 34-37. https://doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2015.1047084
Chile Ministerio de Hacienda. (s.f.) Estado de operaciones del gobierno central 1990 – 2017. Recuperado de http://www.dipres.gob.cl/594/w3-propertyvalue-15494.html
Chile Ministerio de Planificación y Cooperación. (1998). Impacto de la política habitacional chilena. Santiago: Autor.
Chile Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo. (2004). Un siglo de políticas en vivienda y barrio. Santiago: Autor.
Drazen, A. y Eslava, M. (2010). Electoral manipulation via voter-friendly spending: Theory and evidence. Journal of Development Economics, 92(1), 39-52. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2009.01.001
Efthyvoulou, G. (2012). Political budget cycles in the European Union and the impact of political pressures. Public Choice, 153(3-4), 295-327. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-011-9795-x
Eibl, F. y Lynge-Mangueira, H. (2017). Electoral confidence and political budget cycles in non-OECD countries. Studies in Comparative International Development, 52(1), 1-19. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12116-016-9230-x
Katsimi, M. y Sarantides, V. (2012). Do elections affect the composition of fiscal policy in developed, established democracies? Public Choice, 151(1), p. 325-362. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-010-9749-8
Khemani, S. (2004). Political cycles in a developing economy: effect of elections in the Indian states. Journal of Development Economics, 73(1), 125-154. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2003.01.002
Maskin, E. y Tirole, J. (2004). The politician and the judge: Accountability in government. American Economic Review, 94(4), 1034-1054. https://doi.org/10.1257/0002828042002606
Nordhaus, W.D. (1975). The political business cycle. The Review of Economic Studies, 42(2), 169-190. https://doi.org/10.2307/2296528
Persson, T. y Tabellini, G. (1990). Macroeconomic policy, credibility and politics. Abingdon: Taylor & Francis.
Persson, T. y Tabellini, G. (2003). Do electoral cycles differ across political systems? Milan: IGIER.
Rogoff, K. (1987). Equilibrium political budget cycles. Cambridge, MA.: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Rogoff, K. y Sibert, A. (1988). Elections and macroeconomic policy cycles. The Review of Economic Studies, 55(1), 1-16. https://doi.org/10.2307/2297526
Shi, M. y Svensson, J. (2002). Conditional political budget cycles. London: Centre for Economic Policy Research.
Shi, M. y Svensson, J. (2006). Political budget cycles: Do they differ across countries and why? Journal of Public Economics, 90(8-9), 1367-1389. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2005.09.009
Spence, M. (1973). Job market signaling. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 87(3), p. 355-374. https://doi.org/10.2307/1882010
Vergne, C. (2009). Democracy, elections and allocation of public expenditures in developing countries. European Journal of Political Economy, 25(1), 63-77. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2008.09.003
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